Forum in Englisch

Private Interessensgebiete, Hobbies, Freizeit, Soziales, Berufliches, Umwelt; eigene Überlebens- und Problembewältigungs-Strategien; empfehlenswerte Literatur- und Medienbeiträge zum Thema Suizid, Selbstbestimmung, freier Wille usw.

Moderatoren: Ludwig A. Minelli, Mediator

Antworten
Nejat Brohi
Beiträge: 2
Registriert: Samstag 24. Juli 2010, 10:42

Forum in Englisch

Beitrag von Nejat Brohi »

ist es möglich, einem Tag?
Mein Deutsch ist nicht gut, und ich bin mit '' Google Translator '', der mit sich einige Probleme. manchmal ist es wirklich hart, um Übersetzungen zu verstehen, wird es so hilfreich, ein Englisch Schnitt aufweisen. (I schrieb diese Meldung durch Übersetzer, sorry für die Fehler)
glycerine

Re: Forum in Englisch

Beitrag von glycerine »

Ob es an einem Tag möglich ist, wohl kaum.
whocares
Beiträge: 69
Registriert: Donnerstag 3. November 2016, 17:07

Re: Forum in Englisch

Beitrag von whocares »

Well here my sloppy and in regard to missspellings etc. not corrected (can`t be arsed, but it should be understandable anyway...the only relevant criteria here) free translation of something posted here in German concerning the theme of `free will`. If not of any interesst no problem...I had translated it for someone else anyway, just needed to `past` it here.

Here we go: 1. Does a `free will` exist understood as the capability to act, think, decide in a given situation in more than one way? That is: in a situation with exactly the same circumstances (outer world and inner world) one has really more than one option. (Really means: looking forward: the future is not determined...that is: the future is not the necessary effect of all the relevant causes at a given present moment). Looking backwards this would imply that I could have chosen or acted different to how I actually did. And this not only meaning that I had the capability or intersts to do something different but that another choice could have actually been realized. This aspect of `free will` is that of indeterminism. A free will in this sense can not be determined, as a determined will could never have a real choice, the future wouls soley depend on given facts at a given moment (if it was so, one could predict theoretically how any person would choose or act, not so in an indeterministic situation). Well, this argument alone is enough to acknowledge that the idea of an indeteministic free would be something very unusual. The only things in our world we know of that aren`t deterministic are some effects in quantum physics (a kind of causal probability). To make it short: if something isn`t determined it can only we indetermined with the meaning of randomness (an indeterministic choice would be similar to throwing a dice: which number falls is random...in reality it isn`t of course, but it illustrates what indeterministic means concerning `free will`: I can jump from a bridge or not if it is indeterministic, the chance would be 50:50 and why the choice would be this and not something else would be totally inexplainable...certainly that is not the case, that is: we are in some Kind restricted to choose within a certain real of vital interests etc.). So allthough a `free will` can`t be indetermnistic in a random meaning it can`t be determined as most things seem to be we know of.) So we must define `free will` not only as an indeterministic but also as self-determined. I am the person who chooses and acts, not some random mechanism is the cause of how I choose but I am that cause. This is a not deniable assumption as we actually do act in relation to our wishes, interests, values etc. (if one would act not in correspondance to our highest values one would most probably be shocked and would not interprete such a choice as an act of the `free will`...and even if one did: in that case only such unforseeable choices could be called free, not the ones within the range oof our values etc.) Does this mean that we are determined? Well, there is one option open: we could be able to act corresponding to our highest values, interests, wishes etc. and at the same time be free to act free within such boundaries (I like coffee and tea...so I could be free to really choose between drinking coffee or tee as neither choice would collide with any wish or interest I may have.) But this option is also a non existing one as the following argument shows: who decides, chooses? I, I myself... who or what else (of course neuroscientists say tthe brain)? This `I` or `me` can be thought of in 2 different ways and not more, and both of them exclude a possible free will, that is an indeterministic-self-determined will. Option 1: the `I` is identical with all or a part of the mental phenomena which are causal relevant in a certain situation when making a choice. If we define our `I` like this then the following problem arises: an `I` which is identical with a part or all of the relevant mental phaenomena (wishes, interests, values, thoufgts, arguments etc.) must be determined by these as nothing exists besides these mental phaenomena. If the `I` is nothing else than these phaenomena then these phaenomena are enough to `make` a choice (the same is the case if we believe the `I` is identical with only a part of these phaenomena, as for example our rational thinking...the Problem remains the same: ozr rational arguments are as such enough to force a choice AND more important: nothinhg else causal relevant can exist if we say that `I` am identical to such phaenomena.) Option 2: we define our `I` as being empty from any mental phaenomena. In this meaning it would be like a spectator of our mental phaenomena and the things in the outer world. (And we can certainly perceive us `somehow` like this, as we can perceive us also as being an `I` described as in Option 1.) The Problem with this definition of `I` is obvious: an `I` free of all mental content, a pure neutral spectator, without wishes, values, interests could never be causal relevant. Why and how should/could such an `I` play a causal role in how I choose? Such an `I` would reflect everything just like a mirror reflects everything without being fond of some things and finding other appearing things unlikable. Being able to do such the I would need values as mental content by which it would judge the different mental phaenomena and things of the outer world. But containg such values would mean tht the `I` would be an `I` described as in option 1. Such an `I` would be determined by ist mental contents as the `I` would be identical with them. So this is the argumentation against free will. It is in my eyes and i the eyes of the most philosophers irrefutable for the simple reason that we can`t imagine how a not determined free will or `I` (we only have the two options concerning the `I` as described). But also because such an `I` would lead to absurd consequences. One last thing: any philosopher who argues for an indeterministic-self-determined free will, will with necessaty not be able to solve the above problems. There exists simply no Argument which could refute the above argumentation. Philosophers arguing for a fre will, will therefore never try to solve these problems, but will try to bypass them but giving the Impression that they are trying to refute them. I would bet a lot of money that I can show how and where the above mentioned problems haven`t been solved from any person who says he can show why an indetermnistic-self-determined `free will` can exist. Theologians are more truthfull in this respect as they mostly only say that a `free will` exists (of course bacause it can`t be what is not allowed to be...without a `free will` almost every religion would collapse within itself, as would most ideologies, if not all relevant to the question regarding the sense of life etc.). The denial of `free will` is a nihilistic Position no doubt, but at the same time not refutable. (And by the way: there exist more very strong arguments against such a concept of `free will`...but the mentioned ones above are the core of all reasoning against free will. And: all of the evidence we have convincing us that we do have a free will...feeling free or experiencing the decision making as something in which `we` are very mich involved, can be explained very easily with a crtain concept of the `I`, that makes the position of People reasoning for `free will` in the above meaning even weaker. A last thing: most philosophers have another concept of free will which is compatible with determinism. This of course only because the concept of an indeterministc-self-determined free will is more han just problematic. This solution, free will as being compatible with the will being determined makes some sense in regard to very specific aspects. But never can it reason how People could be morally responsible in a deeper meaning. Sad to say thatmost of these compatibilistc philosophers believe otherwise (and again: only because what isn`t allowed to be can`t be...but this time based on a total misunderstanding of the moral and legal consequences of a denial of free will.) 
Antworten